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SOUTH CAROLINA v. CATAWBA
A STATE'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND
APPLICABLE TO AN EASTERN TRIBE'S LAND CLAIM
A Termination Act's effect on an eastern Indian land claim-Federal
Indian Law South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, U.S.__,
106 S.Ct. 2039, _L.Ed.2d._ (1986). The Supreme Court of the
United States held the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act
represented an explicit redefinition of the relationship between the
Catawba Tribe and the federal government, and thus required the
application of South Carolina's statute of limitations to the Catawbas'
land claim.
INTRODUCTION
The federal government's unique relationship with American Indian
Tribes is often characterized as a guardian-ward or trust relationship.'
The decision of South Carolina v. Catawba tested this relationship be-
tween the federal government and the Catawba Indian Tribe (Tribe). In
Catawba the Tribe brought suit against South Carolina alleging that the
state had "purchased" the Catawbas' land without United States' ap-
proval, thereby violating the Nonintercourse Act.3 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the Termination Act had dissolved any federal protection
1. This relationship will be discussed more fully at infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
2. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2039 (1986) (hereinafter South
Carolina v. Catawba.]
3. In 1790 Congress enacted the first Indian Nonintercourse Act which declared:
That no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having
the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly
executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States. Act of July
22, 1790, ch. 33 §4, 1 Stat. 137.
This provision was reenacted with minor modifications in the subsequent Trade and Intercourse
Acts and Revised Statutes and is now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 as follows:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity,
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.
Every person who, not being employed under the authority of the United States, attempts
to negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with any such
nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by them held or claimed,
is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State who may be present at any treaty
held with Indians under the authority of the United States, in the presence and with the
approbation of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the same, may,
however, propose to, and adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for their
claim to lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.
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of tribal rights under the Nonintercourse Act. The Court found that, in
the absence of an existing trust relationship, subjecting the Tribe's claims
against South Carolina to South Carolina's statute of limitations did not
conflict with federal policy. The Court's holding that South Carolina's
statute of limitations would apply may bar the Catawbas' claim against
South Carolina.
Catawba is important to Indian Tribes because the decision represents
a departure from the Supreme Court's traditional treatment of whether a
federal-trust relationship exists between a Tribe and the federal govern-
ment. In Catawba the Court departed from Menominee Tribe v. United
States. In Menominee the Court held that when Congress intends to
abrogate an Indian Tribe's rights that intention must be clear and express.4
The decision in Catawba is also a departure from Oneida Nation v. Oneida
County where the Court held federal policy shielded equally ancient tribal
claims from application of a state statute of limitations.' For the first time
a state's statute of limitations will apply to an Indian land claim based
on a violation of federal law.
FACTS
Prior to European settlement in North America the Catawba Tribe
occupied territory now part of South and North Carolina. In the 1760s
the Tribe entered into two treaties with England relinquishing aboriginal
territory in return for greater protections on a smaller tract of land.6 In
1840, following the Revolutionary War and the passage of the Nonin-
tercourse Act, the Catawbas and South Carolina entered into the Treaty
of Nation Ford.7 In the treaty, the Tribe relinquished all their land in
exchange for two promises. First, South Carolina promised to pay the
Tribe $16,000 in a series of payments! Second, South Carolina promised
4. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
5. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).
6. The Tribe and the King of England's Superintendent for Indian Affairs entered into the Treaty
of Pine Tree Hill in 1760. The Catawba's relinquished their aboriginal territory in exchange for the
right to settle on a 225-square-mile-tract of land. P. DAMMANN, D. Miu.ER & D. ISRAEL, A HISTORY
OF TlE CATAWBA TRIBE AND ITS RESERVATION LANDS 46-50 (1978), reprinted in Settlement of the
Intercourse Claims of the Catawba Indian Land Claims: Hearings on H.R. 3274 Before the House
Comm. on Interior & InsularAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 181-85 (1979) [hereinafter HIsToRY].
In the Treaty of Augusta the Catawbas reasserted their claims to aboriginal territory in protest to
England's failure to carry out the terms of the 1760 treaty. Id. at 24.
7. South Carolina initially recognized the Treaty of Augusta after the Revolutionary War, however,
settlers exerted pressure on the state. Almost all of the Catawba's 144,00 acres of land reserved in
the Treaty of Augusta had been leased to non-Indians by the 1830s pursuant to South Carolina's
state statutes. South Carolina began negotiations with the Tribe to purchase the land. These efforts
resulted in the Treaty of Nation Ford in 1840 where the Tribe gave up the 144,000 acres of land
granted to them by the treaties of 1760 and 1763. In exchange for the land, the state agreed to spend
$5,000 to acquire a new reservation, to pay $2,000 upon signing, and to make yearly payments of
$1,500 for 9 years. The United States did not participate and was not a party of the Treaty of Nation
Ford. Id. at 46-48. (Treaty at Nation Ford, Mar. 3, 1840 art. I and II).
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it would acquire a new reservation "of the value of five thousand dol-
lars. 9 The state, however, did not live up to the terms of the Treaty of
Nation Ford."0
In the early 1900s the Catawbas petitioned both South Carolina and
the federal government arguing that the 1840 transfer was void because
it had not been approved by the United States. " The Catawbas' continuous
and persistant efforts to resolve the claim were futile.' 2
The importance of the Catawbas' claim was underscored by the South
Carolina's attempt to have the Catawbas' claim traded for federal benefits.
The Tribe had sought to gain federal government assistance since the
Tribe was experiencing severe economic hardship. In order to gain federal
assistance, the state announced that it would join in an assistance program
for the Tribe if the Tribe agreed to drop its claims against South Carolina. '"
The Department of the Interior refused to extinguish the tribal claim as
part'of the agreement.' 4 While the Catawba Tribe, South Carolina, and
the Department of the Interior entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing in 1943, the Memorandum did not address the Catawbas' claim
against South Carolina. The Memorandum did set forth the responsibilities
of all the parties with respect to providing rehabilitative assistance to the
Tribe. 15
8. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2048.
9. Id.
10. The state never purchased the new reservation promised in the Treaty of Nation Ford. Con-
sequently, the Catawba wandered for two years. HISTORY, supra note 6, at 48-49. In 1842 South
Carolina purchased 630 acres of land for $2,000. The land was part of the tribe's original reservation.
Settlement of the Catawba Indian Tribe Land Claims: Hearings on H.R. 3274 Before the House
Comm. on Interior & insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings].
1I. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2048-49.
12. In 1906 and in 1909, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs advised the Catawbas that the
Department of the Interior would not seek relief on their behalf. The decision was based on two
factors: I) the Commissioner ruled that the Catawbas were "state Indians"; and 2) the United States
had no responsibility for them. Therefore, the absence of federal participation in the Treaty of Nation
Ford did not void the transaction. Id. at 2049. The South Carolina Attorney General voiced the same
conclusion in 1908 advising the State Legislature that the Catawbas had no outstanding claim to any
of the 144,000 acres of land. Id. In Dec. 1910, a federal Indian agent advised the Catawbas that
the Deparment of the Interior would not take their case into court. Id.
13. HISTORY, supra note 6, at 57.
14. Id. In preliminary drafts of the Memorandum, South Carolina sought to include a waiver by
the Catawbas of any outstanding claims against the state. South Carolina v Catawba at 2042 n.8.
This provision was deleted by federal officials since the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior
emphasized that the agreement should not use "a contract under the Johnson-O'Malley Act in order
to deprive the Indian tribe of claims which it might be able to enforce in the courts." Id. The
Memorandum contained no provision extinguishing the Catawba Tribe's land claim.
15. In this Memorandum the federal government agreed to provide services in the areas of health,
education, and economic development for the Catawba. The state agreed to purchase 3,434 acres
of land for the Tribe which would be held in trust by the United States. The state acquired the 3,434
acres of farmland near the 630 acre reservation and conveyed title to the Secretary of Interior.
However, the state did not convey title to the 630 acres of land. Catawba Indian Tribe of South
Carolina v. State of South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Catawba
Indian Tribe].
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The Tribe never lost sight of its claims even during the termination era
which began in 1953. " The federal government viewed the Catawba Tribe
as a likely candidate for the withdrawal of federal services. In 1958
representatives from the Bureau of Indian Affairs suggested that the Ca-
tawbas' financial problems could be settled if the Tribe distributed its
federally supervised assets and ended federal restrictions on alienation of
its land. ' 7 Facing financial problems, the Tribe agreed with this alternative.
On January 3, 1959, the Catawba Tribe enacted a resolution drafted by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs which directed South Carolina Congressman
Robert Hemphill to request Congress to remove the federal restrictions
on Catawba tribal land. The resolution specifically noted that nothing in
the legislation should affect the status of any claims against the State of
South Carolina by the Catawba Tribe.'"
Thereafter, Hemphill asked the Department of Interior to draft a bill
"that would accomplish the desires set forth in the Tribal Resolution. ,9
On March 28, 1959 the Tribe approved a draft of the bill forty to sev-
enteen. Congress enacted the legislation as H.R. 6128 on April 7, 1959.20
In the 1970s the Catawbas renewed their request to the Department of
the Interior to seek relief for the Tribe's claim against South Carolina.2
In 1975 the Catawbas sought legal assistance, and in 1976 the Catawba
leaders met with the South Carolina governor and attorney general to
discuss the possibility of a settlement. 2 In 1977 the Tribe decided to seek
a congressional settlement of their claims.23 In 1979, the Department of
16. The Termination era began with the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108 on Aug.
I, 1953. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2042. The period continued until the mid-1960s.
Id. The federal government "endeavored to terminate its supervisory responsibilities for Indian
tribes" during this period. Id.
17. Id. Members of the Catawba Tribe wanted to put an end to federal restrictions on alienation
in order to facilitate financing for homes, farm operations and improvements on the 3,434 acre
reservation. Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1294. The members were concerned about the Tribe's
claim against South Carolina. However, an officer from the Bureau of Indian Affairs assured them
that any program would not affect any claim the Tribe might later have against the state involving
the "original" reservation (the 630 acres) Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1296 n.9 and accom-
panying text. 18. Hearings, supra note 10, at 108-109.
19. HIsTORY, supra note 6, at 59.
20. H.R. CONG. REP. No. 6128, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959). The House of Representatives
and the Senate Committee reports both stated that the purpose of H.R. 6128 was only "to provide
for the division of assets of the Catawa Indian Tribe of South Carolina among its enrolled members
in approximately equal shares." S. REP. No. 863, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959) reprinted in 1959
U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2671, 2672.
21. In 1977, the Solicitor of the Department concluded that the statements given to the Tribe in
1906 and 1909 had been legally unjustified and the Tribe could establish a case for the 144,000
acres. The Solicitor concluded that the Division of Assets Act operated prospectively and did not
affect pre-existing rights. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2050. The Solicitor formally
requested the Department of Justice to begin legal action on the Tribe's behalf and to support
settlement discussions that the Tribe had begun with South Carolina state officials. Id.
22. Hearings, supra note 10, at 111-12.
23. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2050.
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Interior and the Tribe presented a proposal settlement to Congress.'
In October 1980, after legislative efforts failed, the Tribe filed suit
against the state.' South Carolina responded that the 1959 Act barred the
Catawbas' claim because, among other things, the Act terminated the
Tribe's special status as a federally protected entity.' The District Court
agreed with South Carolina.27
The Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal on several grounds. A three-
judge panel held that the 1959 Act did not extinguish the Tribe's existence
or terminate the federal-tribal relationship arising out of the Noninter-
course Act.28 The court also held that the Nonintercourse Act and the
Supremacy Clause prevented the application of South Carolina's statute
of limitations to the Tribe's claim.29 The decision was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit sitting en banc."
By a six-to-three vote the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit's decision.3 The Supreme Court held that the 1959 Act
was an explicit redefinition of the relationship between the Catawba Indian
Tribe and the federal government. Since the 1959 Act contemplated ter-
mination of the federal-tribal relationship, the Court reasoned that it was
not contrary to federal policy to apply South Carolina's statute of limi-
tations to the Catawbas' claim for possession of the land. The case was
24. The settlement called for the establishment of a reservation, creation of a tribal development
fund, and reauthorization of federal recognition in return for the Tribe's release of its claims to
occupied lands. Hearings, supra note 10, at 112-13.
25. In its suit, the Tribe claimed that it acquired a vested property right in the 144,000 acres of
land granted in 1760 and 1763 and that the land came within the scope of the federal program for
the protection of Indian lands. The Tribe also argued that the 1840 Treaty of Nation Ford was void
under the Nonintercourse Act because the United States did not participate or consent to the transfer
of the reservation. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, No. 90-2050-0 (D.S.C., filed Oct. 28,
1980).
26. The state believed that § 935 of the Act terminated the Tribe, ended any trust relationship
between the Tribe and the federal government, and made state law applicable to the Tribe's claim.
It also argued that the legislative history supported the interpretation and indicated Congress intended
to ratify the 1840 treaty. Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1294.
27. The District Court granted South Carolina's motion for summary judgment holding that the
1959 Act "extinguished the Tribe's existence; ratified the 1840 treaty [where the Catawbas ceded
the 144,000 acres of land to South Carolina] ; terminated the trust relationship between the Tribe
and the federal government; and made state law applicable to the Tribe's claim." Catawba Indian
Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1295. In addition, the District Court held that the Tribe's claim was barred by
the ten year statute of limitations. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-340 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
28. Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1299-1300. The court held that the 1959 Act did not ratify
the 1840 treaty, extinguish the Tribe's existence, terminate the trust relationship of the Tribe with
the federal government arising out of the Nonintercourse Act, or make the state statute of limitations
applicable to the Tribe's claim. Id.
29. Id. at 1300. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 R.2d 612, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938).
30. Sitting en banc, the full Court of Appeals adopted the panel's decision. Catawba Indian Tribe
v. South Carolina, 740 F.2d 305 (1984).
31. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2039.
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remanded to the Fourth Circuit to review the District Court's interpretation
of state law.32
BACKGROUND
The Trust Relationship
The federal trust relationship33 between the United States and Indian
Tribes first appeared in Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia."' The trust relationship protects Indian property rights
and Indian self-government from encroachment by states and individu-
als.35 The congressional enactment of the Nonintercourse Act illustrates
the federal government's responsibility to protect Indian property rights.36
Congress has plenary power to legislate with regard to Indian Tribes.
As a consequence, Congress has been held to have, within Constitutional
limits, the power to terminate the rights guaranteed to any Tribe.37 In the
conduct of federal Indian affairs, Congress must also meet obligations
imposed by the trust responsibility. These dual and contradictory role as
guardian and terminator creates tension when Congress exercises its plen-
ary power.38
Both the trust responsibility and the United States Constitution place
limits on Congress when it chooses to abrogate tribal rights. The acts of
32. Id. at 2046.
33. "Trust obligations define the required standard of conduct for federal officials and Congress.
Fiduciary duties form the substantive basis for various claims against the federal government. Even
more broadly, federal action toward Indians as expressed in treaties, agreements, statutes, executive
orders, and administrative regulations is construed in light of the trust responsibility. As a result,
the trust responsibility is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law." F. COHEN, FELix S. CoHEN's
H65, 569 (1912). See generally F. CottN, supra note 33, at 221-25.
34. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). Georgia attempted to pass law that
would in effect destroy the Cherokee Nation's form of government. Justice Marshall held that the
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case, stating that the Cherokees were a "state" in the
sense of being "a distinct political society ... capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself ..... Id. at 15. The court stated that the tribes, "may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations ... in a state of pupilage." Id. at 17 and concluded that "their relation
to the United States resembled that of a ward to his guardian." Id.
35. "The Marshallian guardianship or trust responsibility can also be viewed as an expansive
protection of the tribe's status as a self-governing entity as well as its property rights." Chambers,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians. 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1219-
20 (1975).
36. One of the Nonintercourse Act's purposes was to protect Indian Tribes' right to property by
guaranteeing Indian Tribes' right of occupancy to tribal lands. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 668 (1974) (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
345 (1941)); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Dev. Corp., 418 F.Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
37. Congress has plenary power to legislate with regard to Indians. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Court held that Congress' exercise of plenary power over Indians was a
political issue. However, in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) nonreviewability
was rejected when the court held that congressional power to control Indian affairs is not absolute.
The Court stated that the power is subject to guardianshp and constitutional limits. Id. at 415.
38. See infra note 39.
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Congress must be rationally related to fulfilling its trust responsibility.39
Additionally, special canons of statutory construction were developed by
the courts to ensure that the intent of Congress and that of Tribes are
clearly manifested in legislation.'
The Oneida and Passamaquoddy Tribal Land Claims
Litigation over the Oneida4' and the Passamaquoddy42 tribal land claims
shaped the issues concerning Indian land claims under the Nonintercourse
Act. The Passamaquoddy Tribe sought a declaration that the Noninter-
course Act applied to the Passamaquoddy and established a trust rela-
tionship between the Tribe and the United States.43 In Joint Tribal Council
of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, the District Court held that the
Passamaquoddy were a Tribe within the meaning of the Nonintercourse
Act and that there was a trust relationship between the United States and
the Tribe. ' The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision that
39. When Congress acts to control or manage Indian interests, the exercise of its plenary power
must be rationally related to fulfilling the trust responsibility. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977). Additionally, Congress must discharge these duties with "good
faith and fairness." United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924).
40. Trust obligations constrain congressional power in a procedural manner. F. COHEN, supra
note 33, at 221. "Since Congress is exercising a trust responsibility when dealing with Indians,
courts presume that Congress' intent toward them is benevolent and have developed canons of
construction that treaties and other federal action should be read as protecting Indian rights and in
a manner favorable to Indians." Id.
The primary canons of construction in Indian law were first developed in cases involving treaties.
Id. at 222. In construing treaties, courts have required that treaties be liberally construed to favor
Indians. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir.
1939). Courts have required that ambiguous expressions in treaties be resolved in favor of the
Indians. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). Courts
have required that treaties be construed as the Indians would have understood them. See, e.g.,
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304
U.S. I1t, 116 (1938); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). In addition similar rules of
construction have been applied to circumstances where treaties were not involved. See, e.g. Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. 2399 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96
(1976); and Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).
41. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) [hereinafter Oneida 1];
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter County
of Oneida]; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, (1985) [hereinafter Oneida
11].
42. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 649 (D.Me. 1975)
[hereinafter Joint Tribal Council].
43. In 1972, the Passamaquoddy Tribe petitioned the Secretary of Interior for a recommendation
to allow the Justice Department to file suit for the violation. The Department refused the request.
Thereafter, the Tribe filed suit seeking an order to compel the Justice Department to sue Maine on
the Tribe's behalf. The District Court ordered the United States to file a protective complaint.
Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Murphy, 426 F.Supp. 132, 135 n.4 (D.R.I. 1976).
44. Joint Tribal Council, 388 F.Supp. at 649 (D. Me. 1975).
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there was a trust relationship between the United States and the Passa-
maquoddy with respect to tribal lands subject to the Nonintercourse Act."5
The First Circuit recognized that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the
Passamaquoddy even though the Tribe was never formally recognized by
the federal government.'
In 1970 the Oneida Nation of New York and the Oneida Tribe of
Wisconsin filed suit against the New York counties of Oneida and Madison
alleging a violation of the Nonintercourse Act of 1793. The Tribes relied
upon the Act to establish federal question jurisdiction in their complaint."7
The District Court rejected federal jurisdiction and held that the cause of
action arose under state law." The Second Circuit affirmed.49
In Oneida I the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's ruling,
holding that the right of possession based on Indian title was a matter of
federal common law.5 The case was remanded for trial."
Following the trial, which resulted in the District Court awarding dam-
ages to the Oneidas for wrongful possession of their land, the counties
and the state appealed." The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court
ruling, 3 The counties and the state then appealed the decision to the
45. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) [here-
inafter Passamaquoddy].
46. In Passamaquoddy, the Tribe had argued that the Nonintercourse Act applied and established
a trust relationship between the Tribe and the United States even though the Tribe had not been
federally recognized. The Interior Department and the Justice Department reasoned that the Act
applied only to federally recognized tribes. The facts supporting this conclusion were: 1) the Pas-
samaquoddy had never entered into a treaty with the United States; 2) the Passamaquoddy had not
been expressly recognized in federal legislation; and 3) the Passamaquoddy had not received services
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Joint Tribal Council, 388 F.Supp. at 656.
47. The defendants argued the suit was merely an ejectment suit and in turn an example of
jurisdictional failure under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter Oneida Indian Nation].
48. The District Court reasoned that the allegations of the Oneida's possessory rights and de-
fendant's interference with the rights were the essential elements of the pleadings. The need to
interpret the Nonintercourse Act or treaty to resolve a potential defense was reasoned to be insufficient
to allow federal question jurisdiction. Oneida Indian Nation, 464 F.2d at 919-20.
49. Oneida Indian Nation, 464 F.2d at 918.
50. Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 661 (1974).
51. The District Court trifurcated the trial. In the first phase, the court determined the counties
were liable to the Oneidas for wrongful possession of their lands. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter County of Oneida]. In
the second phase, the court awarded the Oneidas damages in the amount of $16,694 plus interest,
which represented the fair rental value of the land in question for the 2-year period specified in the
Oneidas' complaint. Oneida i at 1249. In the final phase, the court held that New York, a third-
party defendant brought in by the counties, must indemnify the counties for damages owed to the
Oneidas. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision with respect to liability and
indemnification. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525 (2nd Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter Oneida County]. However, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the lower court
on the issue of amount of damages. Id. at 542.
52. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. at 527. See supra note 51.
53. Oneida County, 719 F.2d at 525. See supra note 51.
[Vol. 27
SOUTH CAROLNA v. CATAWBA
Supreme Court. The Oneida again claimed a cause of action for a violation
of their possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago.54
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, recognizing that resolution of
this issue was important not only to the Oneidas' current claim, but also
to other potential eastern Indian land claims." The Court held that the
Oneida had a federal common law right of action for violation of their
possessory rights.5 6 The Court also held that the Oneidas' federal common
law right of action was not pre-empted by the Nonintercourse Act.'
Additionally, the Court held that there was no federal statute of limitations
governing federal common law actions by Indians to enforce property
rights."8 In absence of any federal statute, the Court said it would not
borrow a state statute of limitations since borrowing a state statute would
be inconsistent with federal policy.5 9
The two cases illustrate three aspects of federal policy towards Indian
Tribes. First, the Nonintercourse Act acknowledges a trust relationship
between an Indian Tribe and the federal government. Second, the rela-
tionship may exist based upon the Nonintercourse Act alone, even if a
Tribe is not formally and expressly recognized by the federal government
under other statutes.' Third, Oneida represents the Court's apparent
unwillingness to subject a tribal land claim to state law because to do so
would offend federal policy.6
The Effect of Termination on the Trust Relationship
Tension between Congress' plenary power and Congress' trust respon-
sibility to protect Indian property and government is manifested when
Congress chooses to terminate the trust responsibilites owed to a particular
Indian Tribe.62 In the early 1950s termination policies were adopted by
Congress with the goal "as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within
54. Oneida II, 105 S.C. at 1249. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals were able
to resolve the issue of damages to be awarded to the Oneidas. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1250-54.
57. Id. at 1254. The majority stated that "[i]n the absence of a controlling federal limitations
period, the general rule is that a state limitations period for an analogous cause of action is borrowed
and applied to the federal claim, provided that the application of the state statute would not be
inconsistent with underlying federal policies." Id. at 1255. The Court stated that the "borrowing of
a state limitations period in these cases would be inconsistent with federal policy." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
61. Oneida 1, 105 S.Ct. at 1255.
62. The effect of termination has been characterized in the following manner: Termination leg-
islation did not literally terminate the existence of the affected tribes. Further, its effect was not
necessarily to terminate all of the federal government's relationship with those tribes. Tribal powers
can be extinguished only by clear and specific Congressional action. Indian tribes can be recognized
by the United States for some purposes but not for others. F COHEN, supra note 33, at 815.
Fall 19871
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and
entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States, or end their status as wards of the
United States ...and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives
pertaining to American citizenship."'63 Federal courts upheld Congress'
power to terminate a trust relationship pursuant to its plenary power to
deal with Tribes under the Constitution.'
The crucial question in any case involving termination legislation is
whether the specific tribal rights at issue have been terminated. The United
States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Menominee Tribe v. United
States where the Court was asked to determine whether the Menominee
Termination Act of 1962 terminated the Tribe's right to hunt and fish.65
In holding that the Termination Act did not abrogate the treaty hunting
and fishing rights, the Court reasoned that to terminate a tribal right,
Congress' specific intent to do so must be clearly expressed in the wording
of the legislation.6 The court stated that:
[t]he provision of the Termination Act (25 U.S.C. § 899) that "all
statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their
status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the
Tribes" plainly refers to the termination of federal supervision. The
use of the word "statutes" is potent evidence that no treaty was in
mind. (emphasis in original)67
In addition to the language of the Act, the Court looked to statements
made by a legislator principally responsible for guiding the Termination
Act to enactment. Upon signing the bill into law, the legislator stated
that the Termination Act "in no way violates any treaty obligation with
this Tribe."'
The Menominee Termination Act said nothing which would show an
intent to abrogate hunting or fishing rights. In the absence of such lan-
guage, the Court stated "w~e decline to construe the Termination Act as
a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these
Indians. "69
ANALYSIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA V. CATAWBA
One purpose of the 1959 Division of Assets Act, (1959 Act) was to
63. H.R. CONG. REP. No. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
64. Otradovec v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972); Crain v. First Nat'l
Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963).
65. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1967) [hereinafter Menominee].
66. id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. id.
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remove restraints on alienation of the Catawabas' land and to distribute
tribal assets. In South Carolina v. Catawba, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the 1959 Act would also affect trust obligations under
the Nonintercourse Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the 1959 Act
resulted in an explicit redefinition or termination of the relationship be-
tween the Catawbas and the federal government. Consequently, the ma-
jority of the Court held that South Carolina's statute of limitations would
apply retroactively to the Catawbas' claim even though in Oneida II the
Court held that applying state law to an ancient Indian land claim was a
violation of federal policy. ° The Court reached this holding despite the
fact that the 1959 Act contained no language concerning the Catawbas'
claim against South Carolina, and the legislative history indicated that
tribal members were assured that the 1959 Act would not affect their
claim against the state of South Carolina.
Two aspects of the Court's interpretation of the 1959 Act, both critical
to the ultimate decision, deserve scrutiny because both deal with the
scope of the federal government's trust responsibility to Indians. First,
the Court reasoned that the special canons of construction that have been
consistently applied to interpret treaties and agreements between Tribes
and the federal government were not applicable to the 1959 Act.7 Second,
the Court did not apply the rule set forth in Menominee requiring express
language if tribal rights are to be terminated.72
Canons of Construction
Canons of construction are general rules which guide courts in inter-
preting statutes." The trust responsibility between the United States and
Tribes resulted in the judicial recognition of special canons of construction
to interpret treaties and statutes.74 Two canons of particular importance
are: 1) ambiguities in the applicable statutes or treaty must be construed
in the Indians' favor;7" and 2) agreements must be construed as the Indians
would have understood them.76 The majority of the Court viewed Section
70. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2044-45.
71. The majority reasoned that the language in Section 5 was unambiguous. Id. at 2043.
72. The Court made one reference to Menominee in a footnote. Id. at 2045 n.20. The Court
reasoned that the Menominee rule was inapplicable. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
73. Two rules of construction applicable to judicial review of statutes are: repeals by implication
are not favored, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1974); and specific laws prevail overmore
general laws. Id. at 550-51.
74. See supra note 40.
75. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. i, 6-7 (1956).
76. This rule has been applied to treaties which are agreements between tribes and the federal
government. There was a question as to whether this canon of construction should be applied to
statutes or executive orders since neither necessarily directly involve negotiations between tribes and
the federal government. See Washington v. Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
However, the special canon has been applied to statutes. See supra note 40.
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5 of the 1959 Act as being central to the dispute. Section 5 of the 1959
Act states:
The constitution of the Tribe adopted pursuant to sections 461, 462,
463, 464, 465, 466 to 470, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476 to 478, and
479 of this title shall be revoked by the Secretary. Thereafter, the
Tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special
services performed by the United States for Indians because of their
status as Indians, all statutes of the the United States that affect....
Indians shall be inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several
States shall apply to them in the same manner they apply to other
persons or citizens within their jurisdiction .. .. "
The Court in Catawba held that Section 5 of the 1959 Act did not contain
ambiguities which required construing the statute in the Indians' favor."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had reasoned that the provision
of Section 5 relating to "services" and "statutes" only applied to indi-
vidual tribal members, not the Tribe.79 That court found that a claim based
upon the Nonintercourse Act represented a tribal claim, not an individual
tribal member's claim." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Catawbas' claim under the Nonintercourse Act was not governed by the
"service" and "statutes" provision of Section 5.8
The Supreme Court reversed, refusing to apply the canon to its inter-
pretation of Section 5 because it found the section to contain "unmis-
takably clear language" that included the Tribe as well as individual tribal.
members.8 2 The majority stated that "the canon of construction regarding
the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit
reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of
the clearly expressed intent of Congress. "83
The ambiguity in Section 5, however, was apparent to the dissenting
opinion. The dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning that the Act
77. The full text of Section 5 states:
The constitution of the tribe adopted pursuant to §§ 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466-
70, 471-73, 474, 475, 476-78, and 479 of this title shall be revoked by the Secretary.
Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special services
performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all
statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall
be inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the
same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction. Nothing
in this subchapter, however, shall affect the status of such persons as citizens of the
United States. 25 U.S.C. §935.
78. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2044.
79. Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1296.
80. Id. at 1295-96.
81. Id. at 1297.
82. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2043.
83. Id. at 2044.
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clearly expressed, abrogated, or placed procedural conditions on pre-
existing claims." In addition, the dissent stated that the "broad federal
policy against application of state statutes of limitations to Indian land
claims is neither a 'service' nor a 'statute.' ,8 The dissent reasoned that
the effect of Section 5 was simply to establish that the Catawbas were
no longer statutorily barred from selling or leasing land. 6 Thus, the dissent
did not conclude that Section 5 of the 1959 Act was as clear and un-
ambiguous as the majority had read Section 5 to be."7
The majority of the Court did not apply the second special canon of
construction, that agreements should be construed as Indians would have
understood them to be. 8 The Court found that the Fourth Circuit relied
"heavily on the assurance to the Tribe that the status of any claim against
South Carolina would not be affected by the legislation." 9 However, the
majority reasoned that the court of appeals misconceived the import of
such assurance. 9° The majority, while not viewing the Catawbas' claim
as extinguished immediately upon the statute's passage,9' did find that
the statute obligated the Tribe to pursue their claim "in a timely manner
as would any other person or citizen within the States's jurisdiction." 92
Thus, the majority ignored the fact that the tribal members were assured
that the 1959 Act would not affect their claim against South Carolina, a
claim the Catawbas had been pursuing since the early 1900s.
The dissent applied the special canon that agreements must be construed
84. Id at 2052. The court of appeals had stated: "[v]iewed in its entirety, we believe the legislative
history of the 1959 Act fails to suggest any congressional intent to affect any claim the Tribe might
have against South Carolina. Rather, the legislative history and context of the Act indicate it was
intended only to end federal supervision and assistance arising out of the 1943 Memorandum of
Understanding. Although the House and Senate Reports show Congress was aware of the 1840
Treaty, there is no explicit or implicit indication of any desire to extinguish any tribal claims against
South Carolina. Catawba Indian Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1297.
85. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2052.
86. Id.
87. The dissent stated that "[i]n determining whether the 1959 Division of Assets Act exempts
the Catawbas' claim from this general principle [applying a state's statute of limitations to a tribal
property right], analysis must begin with the firmly established rule ... that ambiguities in statutes
regulating Indian affairs are to be construed in the Indians' favor." South Carolina v. Catawba at
2051. See, e.g., Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1258-59; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct.
2102, 2112 (1976); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655, n. 7, 96 S.Ct.
1793, 1797 n. 7 (1976); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, (1975); United
States v. Santa Fe R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353-354, 62 S.Ct. 248, 255 (1941); Alaska Pacific Fisheries
v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 41 (1918); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675,
(1912). See generally F. COHEN supra note 33, at 221-25.
88. The majority reasoned that this canon was irrelevant since the Catawba could have pursued
their claim "in a timely matter." Id. at 2046.
89. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2046.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The fact that the Catawba had pursued their claim against South Carolina in the early
1900s was not significant to the majority.
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as the Indians would have understood them.93 The dissent reasoned that
the statute was passed at the Catawbas' behest and was apparently intended
to carry out the Catawbas' wishes." The dissent stated that the Catawbas
were assured that the statute would not "affect the status" of the Catawbas'
claim.9 Responding to the majority's reasoning that the Catawbas could
have pursued their claim, the dissent argued:
One, of course can distinguish formally, as the majority Idid], be-
tween preserving the "status" of the claim and preserving the claim's
immunity from the state statute of limitations. But the distinction
smacks of the kind of semantic trap that this Court consistently has
attempted to avoid when construing governmental agreements with
Indians and statutes ostensibly passed for the benefit of Indians."
The majority's narrow application of the canons of construction illus-
trates the Supreme Court's recent reluctance to apply the special canons
of construction to statutes.97 In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Pueblo Santa Ana9" the Court, for whom Justice Stevens wrote,
conceded that the language of Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act of
1924 supported both parties' interpretations." However, the Court relied
on the general canon of construction that a statute should not be interpreted
in a manner that rendered one part of it inoperative. "° The dissent in
Mountain States objected to the majority's use of a general canon where
a more specialized canon could be applied."
Catawba furthers this trend in the Supreme Court's analysis of not
applying the special canons. In so doing the Court is ignoring the trust
protections that the canons represent. The special canons of construction
were developed to off-set the unequal bargaining advantages that existed
between Indians and the federal government. 2 These canons are part of
93. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2055.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr. suggests that "there is a weakening in the application
of the canons of construction favorable to the tribes." W. Canby, The Status Of Indian Tribes In
American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REv. 21-22 (1987).
98. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 105 S.Ct. 2587 (1985).
99. Id. at 2590.
100. Id. at 2595.
101. The dissent stated, "I would have thought that the Court, in attempting to drain this statutory
bog, would turn naturally to the canons of construction that have governed Indian-law questions for
the past two centuries-- canons specifically designed to resolve ambiguities in construing provisions
such as Section 17, and which grow directly out of the federal trust responsibilities that define the
conduct of Congress, executive officials, and the courts with respect to Indian tribes." Id. at 2598.
102. These special canons of construction represent an acknowledgment of the superior negotiating
skills and knowledge of the language that were present between tribes and the federal government.
F. COHEN, supra note 33, at 222.
[Vol. 27
SOUTH CAROLINA v. CATAWBA
the trust responsibility. If it is true that the Court is willing to ignore
these special canons, Indian Tribes will indeed be losing a trust protection
and be at a tragic disadvantage.
The Effect of the 1959 Act on the Catawbas' Claim
In Catawba the majority held that Section 5's removal of special ser-
vices and statutory protections included removal of protections under the
Nonintercourse Act."a According to the majority, Section 5 clearly ex-
pressed the intent of Congress.'" The majority stated that "when Congress
removes restraints on alienation by Indians, state laws are fully applicable
to subsequent claims." " The majority added that congressional action
"to remove restraints on alienation and other federal protections represents
a fundamental change in federal policy with respect to the Indians who
are the subject of the particular legislation."" Thus, the majority held
that this "explicit redefinition" between the Tribe and the federal gov-
ernment subjects a Tribe to the "full sweep of state laws and state tax-
ation. "107
In Catawba the dissent applied the standard set forth in Menominee
where the Court required express intent to abrogate Indian rights. The
dissent in Catawba found no express legislative intent to extinguish the
Catawbas' claim against South Carolina through the 1959 Act. 05 The
dissent stated that the use of the terms "services" and "statutes" in the
1959 Act could not provide support "for the view that Congress meant
to impose new procedural requirements on pre-existing tribal land claims
based not only on statutory provisions, but also on treaty rights and federal
common law.""
The majority in Catawba viewed the 1959 Act as fundamentally dif-
ferent than the Termination Act in Menominee. The majority stated the
Termination Act in Menominee involved the abrogation of treaty rights
while the 1959 Act did not."' In Menominee, as the majority recognized,
103. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2043-44.
104. Id. at 2044-45.
105. Id. at 2045.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2044-45.
108. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2053.
109. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2053. The dissent concluded that the 1959 Act
contained no language that indicated Congress meant to abrogate the protections promised to the
Tribe under the treaties of 1760 and 1763.
110. The majority referred to Menominee in one footnote where they stated there was "no similar
contemporaneous statute" involved in Catawba and that in Menominee the Court was "concerned
about a 'backhanded' abrogation of treaty rights." South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2045
n.20. The majority in Catawba did not conclude the similarities between Menominee and Catawba
significant and held that the 1959 Act did not preserve the Nonintercourse Act protections for pre-
existing claims in the absence of an express savings clause in the 1959 Act.
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the treaty rights were protected based upon the federal government's trust
responsibility to the Menominee. The rights which the Catawbas had,
based upon the Nonintercourse Act, were also part of the trust respon-
sibility. 'I The treaty rights involved in Menominee, therefore, are similar
to those involved in Catawba. When the majority concluded that the
Menominee standard was inapplicable, the majority either was implicitly
stating that the Nonintercourse Act does not provide the same protections
as set forth in a treaty or the majority was stating that the protections
under the Nonintercourse Act were terminated by the 1959 Act. If the
latter, then the majority still should have applied the special canons of
construction that the Court applied in Menominee."2 In either case, the
majority cut back on the trust responsibility protections that were present
through the canons of construction or the Nonintercourse Act.
The Catawbas' Land Claim in Light of Oneida I and Oneida I
The Court in Catawba distinguished Oneida H by construing the 1959
Act as terminating the relationship between the federal government and
the Catawba. The majority noted that normally federal policy may pre-
clude application of state statute of limitations, but the 1959 Act allowed
South Carolina's statute of limitations to apply."' The majority stated
that "[w]ithout special federal protection for the Tribe, the state statute
of limitations should apply. . . .,"4
The dissent argued that the 1959 Act did not obviate federal policy
concerns that barred application of a state statute of limitations to Indian
claims in Oneida 1I. "' The dissent stated that the cases that the majority
relied on "were decided well before the emergence during the past 35
years of a clear congressional policy against the application of state
statutes of limitations to Indian land claims.""' 6 The dissent found it
I l. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
112. The Menominee Court cited earlier opinions for the notion that "the intention to abrogate
or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress." Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413.
113. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2044. The majority stated that the Court has "long
recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by Indians, state laws are fully
applicable to subsequent claims." Id. at 2045.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2052. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The dissent noted the cases the
majority relied on involved lands where patents had been issued to individual Indians, not tribal
lands. The dissent stated that the Court in Oneida held that patents were not federal claims. The
dissent concluded that the Catawba case was similar to Oneida I because the Catawbas' claim did
not rest solely on a land claim based on a "federal grant of title" whose scope would be governed
by state law. South Carolina v. Catawba, 105 S.Ct. at 2052. The dissent stated that the Catawbas'
claim ". . . rests on the substantial claim that federal law now protects, and has continuously
protected from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly
apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right
of possession." id. (Quoting Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 647.)
116. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct at 2052.
[Vol, 27
SOUTH CAROLINA v. CATAWBA
difficult to conclude that the 1959 Act could indicate congressional intent
"to subject pre-existing land claims arising under federal law to state
statutes of limitations. ""'7 Thus, the dissent could not agree that the 1959
Act abrogated "broad federal policy against application of state statutes
of limitations to Indian land claims. . .. "'
The dissent's reasoning illustrates the critical importance of the Oneida
opinions. The Court in Oneida I refused to dismiss the Oneidas' claim
based upon procedure. " 9 The Court held that it would be a violation of
federal policy to allow a state statute of limitations to apply to a claim
arising under federal common law in Oneida 11. 2
The application of the state statute of limitations allows South Carolina
to avoid the merits of the Catawbas' claim. In Oneida I the Court did
not allow the state's procedural defense to bar the Oneida from pursuing
their claim on the merits. In Catawba the issue is equally important,
however, application of the statute of limitations forecloses any possibility
of allowing the Catawba to pursue their cause of action on the merits.
The Catawba cessions to South Carolina in the two treaties,' 2 1 without
federal approval, were a violation of the Nonintercourse Act. 22 Before
the transfer, tribal lands were subject to the exclusive control of the United
States. 23 Applying South Carolina's statute of limitations to the Catawbas'
claim effectively extinguishes their title to land the Tribe held as part of
its aboriginal territory. In Oneida 11 the Court stated that the Noninter-
course Act merely "put in statutory form what was or came to be the
accepted rule-that the extinguishment of Indian title required the consent
of the United States.' 24 Thus, the Court would not allow the state statute
of limitations apply.
The Catawbas' brought their complaint asserting a right to possession
of its aboriginal territory based upon the Nonintercourse Act, the Federal
Constitution, and the treaties of 1760 and 1763.2" Each of these bases
derive from the relationship between the United States and the Catawbas.
117. Id. The dissent stated that "even if I agreed with the majority that the removal of restraints
on alienation should trigger the application of state limitations periods, the 1959 Act lifted only
statutory restrictions on the alienation of Catawba land, and the requirement that the Federal Gov-
ernment approve any transfer of the property at issue in this case did not, and does not, stem solely
from any federal statute" Id. (emphasis in original).
118. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2052.
119. Oneida 1, 414 U.S at 676-677, 94 S.Ct. at 781-82.
120. Oneida iI, 105 S.Ct. at 1255.
121. The Catawbas' claim related back to the two treaties the tribe entered into with England.
These treaties assured the Catawbas of 144,000 acres of land. The land set aside for the Catawbas
was within the tribe's aboriginal territory, and in turn their claim derived from original title. South
Carolina v. Catawba. 106 S.Ct. at 2052-53.
122. The Nonintercourse Act requires consent from the federal government to transfer tribal lands.
123. Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 302 U.S. 99, 119 (1960).
124. Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1254.
125. South Carolina v. Catawba, 106 S.Ct. at 2050.
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The application of South Carolina's statute of limitations to this rela-
tionship is inconsistent with federal policy.
26
CONCLUSION
The majority's opinion in Catawba represents a departure from long
respected precedent. In the past, the Court has required that congressional
intent to extinguish an Indian Tribe's rights be plain and unambiguous.
The 1959 Act is not plain and unambiguous when one focuses on the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of the Act. The Catawbas
approved the passage of the 1959 Act upon assurances that the 1959 Act
would not affect their claim. against South Carolina. Furthermore, the
1959 Act is silent concerning the extinguishment of the Catawbas' original
title.
Congress has both plenary power and the responsibility to ensure that
trust obligations are fulfilled. In order to adhere to the trust responsibility,
the Court should apply the special canons of construction to statutes. 27
When the history is replete with evidence that a Tribe entered into an
agreement with specific intentions, the Court should examine the Tribe's
understanding of that agreement.
The most problematic and tragic issue in Catawba is the Supreme
Court's willingness to allow South Carolina to apply state law to an
ancient Indian claim. All that remains upon remand to the federal District
Court is application of South Carolina's statute of limitations. The Ca-
tawbas no longer are able to pursue their claim on the merits. Redress
to the United States Supreme Court, which in the past has been a check
on both the states and Congress, is eliminated with a state's statute of
limitations.
SAMUEL WINDER
126. In Oneida H the Court said "Under the Supremacy Clause, State law time bars, e.g., adverse
possession and laches, do not apply of their own force to Indian land title claims. Oneida Hi, 105
S.Ct. at 1255 n.13.
127. The Court said "[tihe canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians." id. at 1258.
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